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Despite political commitment to address antimicrobial resistance (AMR), countries are facing 2 
challenges to implementing policies to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics. Critical factors to the 3 
success of policy implementation in low and middle income countries, such as capacity for 4 
enforcement, contestation by influential stakeholders and financial interests have been insufficiently 5 
considered. 6 
Using Pakistan as a case study representing a populous country with extremely high antibiotic usage, 7 
we identified 195 actors who affect policies on antibiotic use in humans and animals through a 8 
snowballing process, and interviewed 48 of these who were nominated as most influential. We used 9 
a novel card game based methodology to investigate policy actors’ support for implementation of 10 
different regulatory approaches addressing actions of frontline healthcare providers and antibiotic 11 
producers across the One Health spectrum. 12 
We found that there was only widespread support for implementing hard regulations (prohibiting 13 
certain actions) against antibiotic suppliers with little power – such as unqualified/informal healthcare 14 
providers and animal feed producers – but not to target more powerful groups such as doctors, 15 
farmers, and pharmaceutical companies. Policy actors had limited knowledge to develop 16 
implementation plans to address inappropriate use of antibiotics in animals, even though this was 17 
recognised as a critical driver of AMR. 18 
Our results indicate that local political and economic dynamics may be more salient to policy actors 19 
influencing implementation of AMR national action plans than solutions presented in global guidelines 20 
that rely on implementation of hard regulations. This highlights a disconnect between AMR action 21 
plans and the local contexts where implementation takes place.  Thus if the global strategies to tackle 22 
AMR are to become implementable policies in LMIC, they will need greater appreciation of the power 23 






Despite high-level political commitment to tackle antimicrobial resistance (AMR), moving from 26 
rhetoric to action is proving to be far from straightforward [1,2]. In 2015, all 194 World Health 27 
Organization (WHO) member states endorsed the Global Action Plan on AMR, and committed to 28 
developing multisectoral national action plans (NAP) – considering human, animal and environmental 29 
drivers of AMR - within two years. The reason for this heightened attention to AMR is the huge 30 
predicted impact on morbidity and mortality in humans and animals, on food production, on economic 31 
growth and on global trade and travel [1]. However, only 79 countries had an action plan by 2017, 32 
with progress notably slower in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) [3].  33 
AMR is an archetypal ‘wicked problem’ [4] that presents major challenges for policy implementation 34 
as this requires engagement of many different actors, often with conflicting interests and the power 35 
to influence policymakers [5,6]. In particular, tackling one of the major drivers of AMR – inappropriate 36 
use of antibiotics – requires actions that affect multiple sectors, including human and veterinary 37 
medicine, agriculture, and trade [7,8]; this is why a One Health approach has been proposed. 38 
Inappropriate use encompasses clinically unwarranted or inappropriate dispensing for illnesses in 39 
humans and animals or without a confirmed diagnosis, as well as overuse in farming for growth 40 
promotion and prophylaxis of infectious diseases in animal populations through medicated feed and 41 
water. This contrasts with appropriate use of antibiotics, which is defined as access to quality-assured 42 
drugs, at an effective dose and treatment duration [9], supported by evidence collected through 43 
clinical and laboratory investigation.  44 
There is insufficient evidence about how effective different types of regulatory approaches will be in 45 
moving statements about tackling inappropriate use of antibiotics from paper to practice in LMIC. 46 
Hard regulatory approaches, which appear frequently in Global Action Plan on AMR, typically consist 47 
of binding laws or guidelines with associated penalties for failure to comply, and therefore rely on 48 





licenced pharmacists, implementation of which is supported by clear antimicrobial stewardship 50 
guidelines for secondary care (Start Smart then Focus) and primary care (TARGET antimicrobial toolkit) 51 
[5]. Soft regulatory approaches, in contrast, rely on voluntary compliance often supported by training 52 
[10]. Researchers have highlighted that approaches relying primarily on implementation (including 53 
setting, monitoring and enforcement) of hard regulations in LMIC typically fail owing to interrelated 54 
constraints: insufficient resourcing of regulatory bodies, contestation of regulatory policies by private 55 
stakeholders, low technical capacity or power of regulatory bodies, and insufficient political support 56 
owing to vested interests [5,6]. These issues are particularly salient in relation to addressing 57 
inappropriate use of antibiotics, because suppliers of antibiotics may have a stake in preventing 58 
implementation of regulations that they believe would reduce use to the detriment of their financial 59 
interests. For example, doctors may receive incentives from pharmaceutical companies to over-60 
prescribe specific antibiotics and may oppose antimicrobial stewardship initiatives to check this 61 
behaviour [11]. The political influence of different antibiotic suppliers can be critical in determining 62 
which groups domestic policymakers choose to target with interventions and whether hard or soft 63 
interventions are implemented. For example, interventions that prohibit dispensing of antibiotics by 64 
a small number of drug sellers may receive a different level of opposition to hard interventions that 65 
constrain incentives given to doctors by pharmaceutical representatives. 66 
 Our study systematically identifies policy actors that influence implementation of action plans on 67 
inappropriate use of antibiotics in humans and animals in one high AMR burden LMIC – Pakistan – and 68 
investigates the extent to which the most influential policy actors would support implementation of 69 
different regulatory approaches. We also examine the use of an innovative methodological approach 70 
using a card-sorting exercise to generate richer data from interviews with policy actors. 71 
Characterising suppliers of antibiotics in LMIC  72 
We defined suppliers as organisations or individuals who play a role in the supply of antibiotics to 73 





diverse set of ‘proximate’ suppliers of antibiotics, who are directly involved in providing antibiotics to 75 
patients or farmers [12]. In contrast, ‘distal’ suppliers are organisations that typically provide 76 
antibiotics to proximate suppliers but do not have direct contact with patients or farmers. Table 1 77 
shows the key characteristics of the different suppliers across the One Health spectrum. A critical step 78 
in developing an AMR NAP is to identify which of these suppliers to focus on as target groups of 79 
interventions to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics. 80 
Interventions to address inappropriate use of antibiotics  81 
Potential interventions that could be implemented to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics by 82 
different suppliers were classified into three broad categories (Table 2, [13-15]): encourage (the 83 
softest option, usually positive incentives to encourage adherence to regulations or guidelines without 84 
any penalties); prohibit (the hardest regulatory approach, which typically includes a complete ban on 85 
certain practices with penalties for failure to comply); and constrain (less severe than a complete ban 86 
as it involves restriction of access). Policymakers developing and implementing AMR action plans have 87 
two linked decisions to make: which suppliers of antibiotics should be targeted as a priority in their 88 
context, and what type of intervention(s) should be used.  89 
Methods 90 
Study setting 91 
Pakistan, the sixth most populous country in the world, is facing challenges with high levels of drug 92 
resistance. This was demonstrated by a recent outbreak of multidrug-resistant Salmonella Typhi, 93 
which affected more than 300 patients in two cities within 6 months [16] and has continued to spread. 94 
Pakistan was one of the earliest LMIC to initiate development of a national AMR action plan, being 95 
recognised at the World Health Assembly in 2017 for proactively engaging in the Joint External 96 
Evaluation (JEE) to assess preparedness to combat health emergencies including AMR [17,18]. 97 





had the lowest possible score on capacity and policies to combat AMR [19]. This partly reflected weak 99 
regulations to monitor and control the use of antibiotics in human and animal sectors as noted in the 100 
JEE[19]. For example, even though Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (DRAP) was established 101 
under the DRAP Act of 2012 to provide for effective coordination and enforcement of The Drugs Act 102 
1976, the Pakistan AMR National Action Plan indicates that infectious disease expertise in DRAP and 103 
implementation of the aforementioned regulations is lacking [18]. Similarly, surveys indicate that 104 
human antibiotic consumption is extremely high in Pakistan, and data on use are limited [18,20]. 105 
Challenges to implementing large-scale interventions to reduce excessive antibiotic use in Pakistan 106 
include the presence of very large, well-organised dairy and poultry industries [21], and a health 107 
system that is dominated by for-profit providers; as a result of the lack of provision in the public sector 108 
approximately 80% of the population visit private clinics, with out-of-pocket expenditure estimated at 109 
56% [22,23]. These actors providing antibiotics to human and animal populations may perceive that 110 
their profits are linked to continued overuse of antibiotics and oppose the introduction of specific 111 
interventions. 112 
Data collection 113 
We first conducted a snowballing exercise to identify the range of actors that could influence 114 
operationalisation of government strategies to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics in both humans 115 
or animals (thus applying a One Health lens). We started with a list of 12 ‘seed’ informants covering a 116 
range of core sectors related to AMR, including infectious disease physicians, clinical microbiologists, 117 
veterinarians, government policymakers working in human and animal health, civil society 118 
organisations, media representatives and the pharmaceutical industry. This group included members 119 
of the committee tasked with developing Pakistan’s national AMR action plan. We asked informants 120 
to identify people or organisations that are shaping the approach taken by the government to reduce 121 





nominees by email or telephone and continued the snowballing process until no new actors were 123 
identified.  124 
During the second stage of the study, we contacted actors identified as influential (mentioned at least 125 
twice during snowballing) and interviewed those who agreed to participate in the research. This is the 126 
stage at which we applied our methodological innovation, which allowed us to collect rich qualitative 127 
and quantitative data simultaneously. During the interview we asked actors their views on what types 128 
of interventions – encourage, constrain, prohibit – they would support to address the actions of 129 
specific antibiotic suppliers, explicitly focusing on antibiotic use in human health and animals. If the 130 
interviewee agreed, we used a ‘thinking aloud’ approach in which they were asked to place cards 131 
representing the suppliers listed in Table 1 on pieces of paper printed with Encourage, Constrain or 132 
Prohibit to indicate what type of intervention they would propose to reduce inappropriate use of 133 
antibiotics by that supplier, while talking through their thought process [24,25] (Figure 1). Details of 134 
where each interviewee placed each card were noted and entered into an Excel spreadsheet. The 135 
methodology was piloted in Pakistan by the research team before two researchers conducted the 136 
interviews. Since we were seeking to solicit interviewees’ thoughts about preferred policy options and 137 
contextual factors influencing these thoughts, possible unspoken prior to the interview, we designed 138 
the card-sorting task to help interviewees forget they were being recorded. We anticipated that they 139 
would possibly more open about their views on recommended interventions owing to the 140 
incorporation of this methodological innovation into our interviews. 141 
Interviews lasted 45 to 60 minutes and were run jointly, with the aid of a semi-structured interview 142 
topic guide, by two or three researchers (all female) with post-graduate level training in qualitative 143 
research. The researchers had no prior relationships with the interviewees and had not conducted 144 
research on this topic previously.  145 
All except one interview were conducted face to face. All interviewees gave permission to record the 146 





their workplace. Brief notes were taken by the researchers during the interview and these were 148 
written up immediately after each interview. 149 
Data management and analysis 150 
The interviews were transcribed and translated into English (when required) before thematic analysis 151 
was conducted. All authors, including a veterinarian to ensure a One Health approach during the 152 
analysis, collectively identified and validated emerging themes across a sample of transcripts before a 153 
line-by-line analysis was conducted by two researchers on all 48 interview transcripts, using NVivo 12 154 
qualitative data analysis software (QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 12, 2018). Data from the card 155 
sorting exercise were used to construct bar charts to quantitatively compare responses of actors to 156 
potential interventions addressing different target groups.   157 
We sought feedback on our preliminary results from interviewees and government policymakers from 158 
human and animal health during two consultation workshops that took place at the National Institute 159 
of Health in Islamabad and Aga Khan University in Karachi (November 2018).  160 
The study was approved by the Research Ethics Committees of the Pakistan and UK-based primary 161 
investigators’ institutions.   162 
 163 
Results 164 
Who has influence over policy interventions to reduce antibiotic misuse? 165 
195 policy actors were nominated in total during the snowballing process. The majority of these 166 
worked in the field of human health (n=149), and about one quarter in animal health (n=46). The 167 
pattern of nomination indicated that human health and animal health/livestock actors were typically 168 
not well connected to each other.  169 
Of the 195 actors, we identified 48 as ‘most influential’ based on the frequency of nomination being 170 





proposed implementation of different approaches to address inappropriate use of antibiotics by each 172 
group of suppliers.  173 
Healthcare providers supplying antibiotics to humans 174 
(i) Unqualified healthcare providers 175 
The majority of interviewees who engaged in the card sorting exercise favoured strong measures 176 
(prohibit or constrain) to deal with unqualified providers in the human health sector, specifically drug 177 
sellers and ‘unqualified doctors’ (quacks; Figure 2). Those who did not favour complete banning of 178 
unqualified providers suggested that these suppliers might be allowed to sell a very limited set of 179 
medications such as painkillers but not ‘critical drugs’ such as antibiotics. 180 
When arguing for constrain-type interventions some interviewees expressed reluctance to support 181 
the hardest regulatory measures owing to concerns about lack of universal health access to qualified 182 
providers. Two medically trained interviewees emphasised that quacks and drug sellers provide a 183 
useful service in remote rural areas where there is no other access to the health system.  184 
‘for quackery you not only need to provide more access for the general population to good quality 185 
services in the public sector, but you also need to educate the masses …’ [A47, International 186 
agency]. 187 
(ii) Qualified doctors 188 
In contrast, when asked about measures to address inappropriate prescribing of antibiotics by 189 
qualified doctors, interviewees favoured softer measures (encourage) such as update training or 190 
awareness raising and systems to track prescribing practices to increase transparency. There was a 191 
commonly held view that doctors were ‘doing their best’, sometimes with limited diagnostic (and 192 
other) resources. A range of interviewees highlighted that the lack of resources to guide diagnosis and 193 
decision-making was compounded by inadequacies in medical education; two senior medical 194 





a need to strengthen training: ‘you know, unfortunately, I even call the doctors quacks […] because 196 
the way they prescribe is like quacks’ [A18, Human health government official].  197 
However, not all interviewees favoured a soft approach to doctors. Several focused on the ‘unethical’ 198 
relationship between pharmaceutical companies and medical professionals. They argued that stricter 199 
regulation was required to constrain the incentives provided by these companies that encourage 200 
doctors to prescribe antibiotics.  201 
Interviewees from the public human health sector and the domestic pharmaceutical industry were 202 
more reluctant to support constraints on doctor-pharmaceutical company relations than other actors 203 
such as those representing international agencies and non-profit organisations, perhaps reflecting 204 
their own interests. The Pakistan Medical Association and the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council 205 
were identified by interviewees as having the potential to play a stronger role in improving antibiotic 206 
use by doctors.  207 
(iii) Pharmacies and drug shops 208 
It was widely felt that private pharmacies, with a qualified pharmacist needed to be encouraged, to 209 
support qualified pharmacists in taking over jobs from untrained drug sellers, and that strict 210 
enforcement measures were required to prevent antibiotic dispensing without an appropriate 211 
prescription. Over-the-counter sale of antibiotics was mentioned frequently as a key issue to be 212 
addressed through ‘constrain’ interventions. It was suggested that pharmacists could monitor what 213 





Providers supplying antibiotics to livestock  215 
When discussing suppliers in the animal health or livestock sectors, a large proportion of interviewees 216 
declined to comment due to a perceived lack of expertise.  217 
(i) Veterinarians 218 
Among those who did express a view, veterinarians were commonly perceived to be responsible users 219 
of antibiotics and thus as needing to be supported with ‘encourage’ measures that would allow them 220 
to play a larger role in controlling use of antibiotics in animals (Figure 3). The current limited role of 221 
veterinarians in Pakistan was explained by interviewees to be related to farmers’ tendency to avoid 222 
the expense of paying for a veterinary consultation and instead going directly to pharmacies to buy 223 
antibiotics without a prescription.  224 
(ii) Farmers 225 
Opinions on measures to tackle self-prescription of antibiotics by farmers were divided, mainly 226 
between ‘encourage’ and ‘constrain' approaches. Approximately half of those who responded opted 227 
for encourage measures based on educating farmers to be able to diagnose and treat their animals 228 
(without veterinary input) more effectively. This group of interviewees asserted that harder measures 229 
to prohibit self-prescribing by farmers would not be feasible given how common it is, and instead 230 
better use of antibiotics by farmers should be facilitated:  231 
‘There are huge numbers of farmers and breeders […] they get all these antibiotics [..] so just 232 
prohibit or constrain would not be that much important here […] they should be encouraged 233 
and educated not to use antibiotics, just to give them when needed’ [A11, Animal health 234 
government official]. 235 
Others felt that stronger regulations were needed to prevent overuse of antibiotics, particularly in the 236 
poultry sector, where farmers were believed to administer large quantities of antibiotics to bird 237 





regulate due to its economic power, professional organisation, and the fact that some large poultry 239 
farms are owned by politicians [A11 and A12, Animal health government official; A52, Human health 240 
government official]. 241 
(iii) Animal feed producers 242 
There was greater support for stronger measures to address use of antibiotics by animal feed 243 
producers than farmers, with some interviewees expressing concern about the lack of implementation 244 
of regulations by the government: 245 
‘In the animal feed mills the government should check the ingredients... they [animal feed 246 
producers] are using different drugs and also they are using chemicals in the feed’ [A40, Domestic 247 
non-profit organisation]. 248 
(iv) Animal drug shops and pharmacies 249 
Interviewees commonly stated that shops selling animal drugs need to be regulated and monitored, 250 
and that over-the-counter sales without a prescription should be prohibited. Informal drug sellers, 251 
without a qualified pharmacist, were recognised as a major issue in the animal as well as the human 252 
health sector and most interviewees who responded stated that they should be prohibited from 253 
selling antibiotics: 254 
‘[informal drug sellers] need strict legislation about prohibition because these things should 255 
not exist in the first place… this is a big problem in both humans and animals’ [A11, Animal 256 
health government official].  257 
The support for stringent measures to reduce inappropriate access to antibiotics for animals through 258 
pharmacies and drug sellers contrasted with commonly expressed reluctance to limit access to 259 
antibiotics for farmers. Larger farmers purchase antibiotics directly from pharmaceutical companies 260 
or drug ingredient wholesalers, and therefore prohibition of over-the-counter animal antibiotic sale 261 





Distal suppliers of antibiotics 263 
(i) Supplier of raw materials for pharmaceutical products  264 
There was a general consensus that companies involved in the supply of raw materials for 265 
manufacture or packaging of antibiotics in Pakistan should be constrained (to meet minimum quality 266 
standards) or prohibited (if supplying substandard raw materials) (Figure 4). Our interviews indicated 267 
that it is common practice for pharmaceutical companies to import raw materials and package drugs 268 
for sale in Pakistan. An international agency representative explained that import of raw materials 269 
typically involves a bidding process that selects companies that can supply raw materials at the lowest 270 
price, irrespective of quality. The same interviewee suggested that the government should enforce a 271 
minimum quality standard on suppliers of raw materials that are imported into Pakistan. In general, 272 
quality control was considered an issue both in the animal and human health sectors: 273 
‘We must do something to them, to stop, to prohibit... to stop them preparing compromised 274 
drug[s], which are not quality controlled so I think legislation should be very strict about the drug 275 
ingredient’ [A22, Senior doctor] 276 
(ii) Pharmaceutical companies 277 
The pharmaceutical industry was mentioned frequently as a key actor both in driving inappropriate 278 
use of antibiotics, particularly through using bribes to doctors as a standard practice, and having the 279 
opportunity to affect positive change. Most interviewees chose encourage, constrain or a mixture of 280 
the two to address the role of the pharmaceutical industry and were reluctant to opt for harder 281 
measures:  282 
‘In general encouraging them [pharmaceutical companies] I think, or saying what are best 283 






Interviewees indicated that the limited resources available to the DRAP when compared to those 286 
available to the pharmaceutical industry mean implementation of more stringent measures are 287 
unlikely to be effective. Specifically, it was highlighted that resources available to pharmaceutical 288 
companies could be used to influence doctors’ prescribing behaviour through sponsorship of 289 
continuing medical education and financial incentives offered in return for prescription of their 290 
proprietary medicines, as well as to bribe officers responsible for enforcing rules. In this context, DRAP 291 
was considered necessary to implement measures to address both quality issues and inappropriate 292 
marketing practices by pharmaceutical companies, but was commonly described as ineffectual, 293 
understaffed, and open to influence in its current form: 294 
‘DRAP […] are lacking in human resources. One person, one drug inspector in the whole district, 295 
maybe looking after two to three districts. How can he manage?’ [A35, Human health 296 
government official]. 297 
Some actors were bolder in suggesting that marketing practices of sales representatives giving 298 
financial incentives to doctors, pharmacies or drug sellers to overuse specific antibiotics should be 299 
prohibited.  300 
Differences between the domestic and international pharmaceutical industries were also noted in the 301 
qualitative analysis. Many interviewees perceived international companies to be better regulated than 302 
domestic companies and more likely to be following international guidelines on marketing practices 303 
and internal drug quality controls (e.g. bar coding) to enable better detection of counterfeit drugs. In 304 
contrast, there was a common feeling that domestic companies were often not following ethical 305 
marketing practices, largely because they do not have to abide by the standards that international 306 






This study used a novel approach to systematically investigate support (or lack thereof) for different 309 
interventions to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics among actors who can influence 310 
implementation of policies in Pakistan, applying a One Health lens by including eligible human and 311 
animal health actors in our study. Our findings are novel, timely, and policy-relevant as the majority 312 
of countries report that they are still to develop a strategy to operationalise their AMR NAPs [3], and 313 
there is limited attention given to supporting countries in navigating major political and economic 314 
barriers to implementing actions that potentially reduce the use of antibiotics [5,8,9]. Existing 315 
literature documents a gap in evidence about the types of interventions that might be locally 316 
appropriate in LMIC [26] and about strategies to tackle ‘local barriers’ [11]; our findings address this 317 
gap in evidence for Pakistan, and have implications for other LMIC developing AMR action plans.  318 
Although enactment and enforcement of regulations has been advocated as an important approach 319 
to tackle inappropriate use of antibiotics, many interviewees suggested that doctors and the 320 
pharmaceutical and livestock industries may be too powerful for government agencies to enforce 321 
rules on; the latter were presented as under-resourced, poorly organised, and lacking in authority to 322 
implement the existing regulations, which is similar to the status of regulatory bodies in many LMIC 323 
[22]. Instead, interviewees expressed support for awareness-raising interventions to address 324 
inappropriate prescribing by doctors and farmers, which was acknowledged as a serious issue. 325 
Although resource constraints of regulatory agencies were certainly salient in the Pakistani context, 326 
some interviewees working outside government agencies highlighted that vested interests connecting 327 
politicians and health policymakers with the pharmaceutical and livestock industries may also explain 328 
the reluctance to support harder regulatory approaches. The tendency to take a softer approach based 329 
around awareness raising for doctors, as demonstrated by the placement of cards in the card-sorting 330 
exercise and/or comments in interviews, may also reflect the composition of interviewees who were 331 





prescribing by doctors in LMIC owing to soft interventions that encourage responsible use is currently 333 
lacking [26]. It is important to consider that there is a lack of evidence of a substantial and sustained 334 
impact of awareness campaigns on sustained impact on prescribing practices in LMIC, even though 335 
this is often a politically palatable intervention [26]. In contexts such as Pakistan where doctors rely 336 
on continuing medical education sponsored by pharmaceutical companies, awareness campaigns 337 
alone are unlikely to be effective [27,28].   338 
Out study identified a number of interventions for which there was widespread support from 339 
interviewees across different stakeholder groups, and these could be prioritised as strategies to 340 
address AMR in Pakistan. Among these were prohibition of untrained doctors and unlicensed drug 341 
sellers from providing healthcare services. However, several interviewees highlighted that a major 342 
impediment to implementing a complete ban on unqualified healthcare providers is the lack of public 343 
health services, particularly in rural areas of the country, and therefore preferred to constrain the 344 
types of services provided or to provide basic training to unqualified providers. Our thinking aloud 345 
interviews revealed that this was a major concern for some civil society organisation representatives.  346 
Geographical differences in the distribution of qualified or licenced providers is a well-documented 347 
issue in Pakistan [22,23] and other countries in the region, rendering groups of the population 348 
dependent on unqualified healthcare providers who tend to inappropriately use antibiotics [29,30]. 349 
Our findings from Pakistan indicate that although there is impetus to prevent untrained providers 350 
from operating, a sizeable group of actors may not support a full ban owing to concerns about the 351 
government’s ability to provide health services [31].  352 
Pharmacists and veterinarians were identified two groups that could be empowered to play a bigger 353 
role in ensuring appropriate access, with many interviewees expressing concern that these are often 354 
bypassed by patients and farmers in favour of unqualified drug sellers and self-medication, resulting 355 





A striking finding from the card-sorting exercise was that many that many policy actors, owing to their 357 
human healthcare background, did not feel knowledgeable enough to discuss interventions targeting 358 
suppliers of antibiotics to animals and that actors with animal health expertise were lacking in 359 
regulatory agencies such as DRAP; this may hinder implementation of effective strategies to address 360 
inappropriate use of antibiotic use in animals, despite commitments to applying a One Health 361 
approach by international agencies [3]. Other studies have also reported a (perceived) imbalance in 362 
power and representation between human and animal health stakeholders [32].  363 
We developed and applied a novel method, which benefitted from an initial network analysis that 364 
enabled us to systematically identify actors that were perceived to be most influential, combined with 365 
an innovative card sorting exercise that aimed to facilitate open discussion by policy elites during 366 
interviews [33]. There were two main advantages of our novel methodology. First, the card-sorting 367 
exercise enabled the interviewer and interviewee to follow a more systematic approach to discussing 368 
each supplier of antibiotics one by one. Even if some interviewees were unable to comment on the 369 
role of a particular supplier, the card-sorting exercise allowed this finding to be captured explicitly. 370 
This helped to reveal that many of the influential policy actors did not feel knowledgeable to comment 371 
on interventions addressing antibiotic use in the livestock sector. Second, the card sorting exercise 372 
allowed us to gain information based on where interviewees placed cards (along the spectrum of hard 373 
to soft interventions) even if they did not fully verbalise their rationale.  374 
Reflecting on the value of the card sorting exercise in generating richer qualitative data, we felt that 375 
it did help to initiate dialogue, but it was time-consuming, so some of the interviewees were not able 376 
to complete the exercise. Although the majority of interviewees spoke openly about their support or 377 
opposition for different types of interventions some respondents involved in the implementation of 378 
regulations stated that they were reticent to speak freely while being recorded. In terms of limitations, 379 
this study was conducted in one country, Pakistan, and findings may not be representative of other 380 





Indonesia. In the Cambodian study we reduced the number of cards used, in order to shorten the time 382 
taken, and had cards representing different types of healthcare providers (formal and informal) to 383 
understand policy actors’ support for interventions to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics 384 
targeting each type of healthcare provider [34]. In terms of future work, evidence from this study 385 
about political support for specific interventions targeting individual antibiotic supplier groups could 386 
be coupled with quantitative epidemiological studies of the likely impact on overall inappropriate 387 
antibiotic misuse from these interventions to design evidence-based and politically acceptable policies 388 
to operationalise the national AMR action plan. We found that our methodological innovation could 389 
easily be adapted to study policy actors’ views on interventions to address inappropriate use of 390 
antibiotics, and we would encourage application of the novel method to study other wicked problems 391 
such as tobacco control or regulation of medical education in LMIC contexts.   392 
Conclusion 393 
Our study provides new insights about challenges to implementing hard regulatory approaches to 394 
address inappropriate use of antibiotics in LMIC with weak governance structures, and additionally 395 
developed a new methodology that can be applied to support policy research in other countries.  In 396 
Pakistan we found that measures to prohibit untrained drug sellers and untrained doctors were clearly 397 
more palatable to influential policy actors than implementation of strong regulations targeting groups 398 
perceived to be powerful such as (qualified) doctors, pharmaceutical companies and the livestock 399 
industry. Hard regulatory approaches – such as prescription-only access to antibiotics or banning of 400 
growth promoters in livestock – were considered ‘technical’ solutions which do not take account of 401 
the political opposition these may face.  402 
These findings have implications for other countries developing AMR NAP as they highlight the need 403 
for a clear understanding of socio-economic context, policy processes and underlying interests and 404 
power [33]. We conclude that in each country prioritising development of a NAP, an analysis of the 405 





national efforts to tackle AMR. Such an analysis will enable development of more effective strategies 407 
that that will incorporate a greater appreciation of the power dynamics and systemic constraints that 408 
relate to many of the strategies proposed. Ultimately, if ambitious global strategies to tackle AMR, 409 
such as the Global Action Plan on AMR, are to become implementable in LMIC, they will need to strike 410 
a balance between technically ideal solutions and options that are feasible to implement.  411 
List of abbreviations: AMR: Antimicrobial resistance; DRAP: Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan; 412 
JEE: Joint External Evaluation; LMIC: Low and middle income countries; NAP: National Acton Plan; 413 
WHO: World Health Organization. 414 
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